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1. The End of Commodity Agreements?
1. On 24th October 1985, the Buffer Stock Manager of the International
Tin Council (ITC) informed the London Metal Exchange that he no Ionger
had sufficient funds to fulfil the ITC's contractual obligations arising from
agreements with the members of the LME . The attempt by the ITC to support
the price of the metal had not only exhausted its reserves, it had also forced it
to take out loans to the value of around E 900 m. Sterling'.
After the collapse, there were negotiations lasting several months between
the ITC member states, with the aim of establishing the right conditions to
rescue the International Tin Agreement. However, the efforts proved fruitless .
2. As regards its inadequate operation, the International Tin Agreement is
certainly not on its own, OPEC, for instance, has been confronted by
problems of this nature for a number of years now, which have forced the
Organization to make a variety of modifications to its export and price
policies'. Other commodity agreements', mainly in the agricultural sector -
coffee, cocoa, wheat, sugar - but also the agreement concerning natural rubber
- are either ineffective in their operational regulations" or, because the con-
tracting parties have recognized this and take account of ir, have been
"downgraded" to mere information and consultation centres",
3. However, up until very recently, it was precisely the International Tin
Agreemenus)" which was (were) described as the only agreement(s) berween
producer and consumer countries that had been reaUy effective and was (were)
currently (i. e. in 1980) still in use, though even here some problems had arisen,
especially as regards the financing of the buffer stock'. What, then, are the
reasons for the coUapse; and do they typically apply only to this non-
agricultural commodity?
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4. Before these questions are dealt with (in section III), it seems necessary to
give an outline of the organization and the areas of operation of the various
intergovernmental commodity agreements (ICAs) in general, and of the
International Tin Agreement in particular (seetion II). However, precisely in
this area of international economic law, two divergent parteras can be disting-
uished. One of these is based essentiallyon chapter VI of the Havana Charter',
whilst the other must be regarded as an integral component of the proposals
for a "New World Economic Order", for which reason it has found acceptance
in non-global, multilateral agreements concerning North-South relationships,
i.e . in the relationships berween the EC and the ACP countries'.
5. However, the events preceding and surrounding UNCTAD VII (1987)
do make it seem probable that the "Common Fund" - and thus the mechanism
of an "integrated commodity prograrnme'"? will soon - at last - come into
existence" . Whether, however, the new organization will have more than just a
paper existence, pivots upon the operation of the individual commodity
agreements which will be ineluded in it. Therefore, the same question applies
to the whole as to the parts: What is the use of (and who benefits from) an ICA
- which is legally still intaet - and what place does it have in today's world
economic order? A provisional answer will be attempted at the conelusion of
these deliberations (seetion V) . .
II. The History and Operation o[ Intergouernmental Commodity Agreements
1. Whilst the first agreements were made as far back as the second half of the
last century, with the aim of putting the sugar-producing countries onto a
similar competitive footing, artempts to stabilize the (export) prices of certain
commodities by private, and also, increasingly, inter-government agreements
dare back to the period after 1918". The agreements which were made at that
time related not least to the tin market, the regulation of which had already
been initiated by several agreements between the major producer countries in
the early thirties, and the regulation mechanisms contained in these are, to a
large degree, similar to those contained in the more recent international treaties
coneluded after 1945".
2. Tbe argument that there is a need for a universal consensus about the
fundamental necessity of a commodity policy, and that, in this area, the
peculiarities of production and marketing make government intervention not
an obstacle to free(r) international trade, but a precondition for it, was not even
disputed by the USA in its proposals for the post-war reconstruction of the
world economy, as developed on the basis of ehe Atlantic Charter" ". On the
other hand, an analysis of the practical operation of the agreements to date
seemed to confirm the conelusion that serious abuses would not be able to be
eliminated, even if overdue structural modifications were made. The concepts
which permeated the preliminary discussions for an "International Trade
Organization" thus centred around the exceptional and fixed-term nature of
any intergovernmental agreements which would be made for the regulation of
the trade in commodities. These ideas also predominate in the formulated draft
treaty : one central aspect is the fair and equal participation of producer and
consumer, exporting and importing countries in every regulatory intervention
(Art. 60 [1] [d]. A further one is ehe differentiation berween the "other" raw
materials agreements to be agreed with less restrictive conditions, and the
restrictive "control" agreements (Art. 61 [1], which were dec1ared to be
permissible only under exceptional circumstances (Art. 62 ff.). However, both
of these goals were subordinated to the central aim of ensuring a long-term
balance between the market forces of supply and demand (Art. 57 [c])".
3. The middle way adopted by the terms of the Havana Charter, berween
the rejection of any market regulation on the one hand, and the support for a
multilateral, intergovernmental regulation of the commodity trade on the
othe r, in that they involved neither the prohibition nor the promotion of
relevant agreements (cf. Art . 55), but were restricted primarily to measures for
the prevention of abuse, was not immediately followed, because the signing of
the Final Act of the UN Conference for Trade and Employment on
24. 3. 194817 was not followed by sufficient ITO ratifications. The United
Stares proved to be the central block on this organization coming into being-
only GATT avoided the fate of being stillborn", On the other hand, the
central concept put forward in the Havana Charter continued for a long time-
right into the seventies - to exert a strong influence on the individual ICAs
which were negotiated in subsequent years.
4. Considerable shifts In emphasis in all these points did not occur until the
UNCTAD starred to become involved with the problems of the international
commodity markets in 196419• In the General and Specific Principles which
were decided at the 1st UNCTAD conference, the aim for (an increase and)
stability of prices wirhin the framework of intergovernmental co-operation
remained a central principle. However, there were signs of a change in the
demands made on the (market-orientated) industrialized countries to take
sufficient account of the demands of the developing countries for fair oppor-
tunities and prices for their exports and to make efforts to ameliorate any
disadvantages arising from substitution (synthetic productsr". Such demands
continued to increase in intensity, with the ultimate aim of enshrining them in
agreements which were binding in international law. Since individual agree-
ments for each commodity did not come into being in any great number, or
bear any (financial) fruits for the producer countries ( in fact, on the contrary,
they became less and less effective and gave rise to fundamental doubts - the
Secretary General of UNCTAD, Corea, put forward a multidimensional
concept in 1974: the "Integrated Programme for Commodities":" .
It is hardly coincidental that this proposal was made shortly after the Sixth
Extraordinary General Assembly of the UN - with its declaration on the
establishment of a "New International Economic Order"" and the demands
made there, and in the accompanying Action Programme, for commodiry
policy to be tied into development policy" - and shortly before the adoption
by the UN General Assembly of the "Charter of Economic Rights and Duties
of Stares'?'. This document, probably the most important in respect of the
"New International Economic Order", broke with traditional international
(law) practice - despite the view of most Western industrialized countries - at
least in two aspects. In the first place, Article 5 (sentence 1) not only recognizes
the right of all states to establish commodiry producer's organizations in order
to develop their economies, achieve stable financing for this, and contribute to
the pursuit of these objectives by promoting steady economic growth -
provisions which particularly benefit the developing countries -, but, in
sentence 2, lays down a corresponding obligation to refrain from any
economic or political measures to curtail this righr", In the second place, Art.
28 contains the obligation to co-operate in establishing mechanisms for
adjusting the export prices of developing countries to their import prices, in
order to work towards fair and just terms of trade for these countries in a way
that is profitable for the producers, and fair for the consumers/". Article 6 pales
by comparison to this, providing for the government obligation to expand
international trade mainly by concluding multilateral commodity agreements
(sentence 1), though with the provision: "where necessary"". Due recognition
should be given to the fact that the interests of both the producers and the
consumers are referred to here, in view of the particular demands of the
developing countries (sentence 2), especially because of the mutualreferences
of all of the Charter provisions in accordance with Art. 33 (2).
5. Even when, at the end of UNCTAD IV, the IPC was voted in (Res. 93
[IV])", its "philosophy" could virtually only gain any acceptance in the
establishment of negotiations in areas where there had previously been no
ICAs". Organizations which included only producer-countries had already
existed previously, but even OPEC still did not manage to garher all producers
- at least from the third world countries - into one associatiorr' ". In 1963, the
IMF had already provided a faciliry for the compensatory financing of losses of
export profits, and in 1969, further special drawing facilities were added,
specifically for commodity buffer srocks", Both the hurdles in the way of
taking these drawing facilities, and the amounts available - which were anyway
repayable in the short-term, or at the latest in the medium term - disappointed
the expectations of the recipients".
The consequences of the approach towards ordered markets matured first of
aI1 in the foreign relations of the EC and its member states with the countries
of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, with which they had panicularly
strong links. The very first Lerne Agreement" established a "system to
guarantee the stabilization of export earnings" - concerning exports of such
products from ACP countries to the Community, upon which the economies
of these developing countries are "dependent" and are "affected by fluctua-
tions in the price and/or volume " (Art. 16). Certainly, the aid from the
Northern partner initially only covered listed agricultural and forestry pro-
ducts, with the exception of iron ore (Art . 17 [1]). "Stabex"" provisions were
also made in the 2nd Lorne Agreement, though the spectrum of commodities
ineluded was considerably widened (Art. 25 [1]), and consequentially also
more funds provided for intervention (cf. Art. 31 with Art. 18 - 550 m , against
375 m. ECU)". However, the second EC/ACP convention also broke new
ground, in that Art . 49 created a new system for those signatories from the
Southern group who were largely economically dependent on the mining
sector, and once again it was mainly to overcome the export (earnings)
problem, "in order to counteract the hannful eHects on the income of
producers, arising from uncontrollable, serious occasional disruptions of the
mining industry""'. In addition to copper, phosphates, manganese, bauxite and
aluminium , and iron ore, "Sysmin"" also ineluded tin (Art. 50 [1]). Finally ,
Lome 3 intensified co-operation in the commodity area, both as regards
agricultural products (and sugar) - Art. 147 H., 175 - and in the particular
financing facility for mining products. The statement of objectives at the start
of chapter 3 of title II (Art. 176) does, however, show that even within the
organizational framework, the rebuilding of a mining industry has now
become much more important than the "mere" remedying of disruptions in
this seetor. Having not even been mentioned in the preceding Agreement text,
by 1985 this objective had moved into first place".
6. The Community model, however, was very -Iittle in common with the
elassic ICAs. Whilst there is the same fundamental aim of counteracting
instability, the main emphasis is on export earnings, and thus on the one group
of the countries involved in the international commodity trade . But this
objective fits into a wider development context of fmancial transfer: "Stabex"
and "Sysmin" are intended to help the producer countries benefitting from
them to overcome one of the major obstaeles in the way of steady, profitable
and lasting economic growth, to seeure ehe economic and social advancement
of their populatiorr". In this, there is some degree of congruence with elements
of the IPC, especially with figs. 1.\.,2., 3. and III.2.(f.) of Resolution 93 (IV).
On the other hand, the other central demand of the IPC for a (market-
independent) increase in export earnings (figs, 1., before \. and 2.) has not been
taken up by the Lome Conventions'", As regards functions, it should not be
overlooked that wide-ranging (economic) co-operation is being striven for in
EC-ACP relationships". Co-operation in the commodities field is not, then,
confined to opening up lines of credit, to the current value of 925 m. (Art. 152)
and 415 m. (Art. 178) ECU, but also involves the liberalizing of imports (cf.
Art. 130) so that new markets are opened to the products of developing
countries, thus realizing a concept which is presumably welcomed by alt
sides", However, both product-related systems simply latch on to the (nega-
tive) results of previous years, arising from events on the international com-
modity markets which affected the (ACP) producer counrries. They have an
indirect intervention effect in the market by allowing the weaker players/
exporters to have a greater scope for parriciparion, and thus avoid a sieuaeion"
in which the countries concerned (are forced to) resort to direct trade
regulation or restrietion measures . To this extent, there is something of a
parallel with the IMF Iacilities".
With regard to the organization for implementing the objectives of the
agreement, it is sufficient to point out that in the Common Commodity Fund,
as elsewhere, the formal sovereign equality of states has had to cede to the
principle, which is widely used in international financial and economic organi-
zations, of weighted voting" in the central organs (Arts. 21, 23). In this point,
the composition of the institutions of the Lorne Convention (cf. simply Art.
22 ff. of the 3rd Agreement), with aSO-50 weighting of each group of
countries, has proved to obe an ideal middle way, which has now also found
favour at the global level".
7. The objectives set down in Art. 1 of the first International Tin Agree-
ment", concluded on 9.12.1953, berween 6 producer and 14 consumer
countries, had been foreshadowed in the Havana Charter, partly in general
terms, and partly pointing to regulatory agreements: the prevention, or at least
reduction, of unemployment and other serious difficulties which can be
expected when there is a wide gap between supply and demand (leerer [al; see
Art. 57 [al, 62 [b] HCh); the prevention of exaggerated price fluctuations and
the achievement of price stability at a fair level, on a basis which will ensure a
Iong-term balance between supply and demand ([b]; see Art. 57 [cl HCh);
constant availability of sufficient supplies at acceptable prices ([c]; see Art. 63
[al HCh); finally a framework for measures to promote more economic
production, but at the same time protecting reserves from over-mining ([d] ;
see Art. 63 [b] H Ch )".
Whilst the second agreement followed this fairly closely", the third one,
signed on 14. 4.1965, already reflects the ideas and formulations ofUNCTAD
1. In particular, Art. I (c) now emphasizes the need to make provisions "which
help to maintain and increase the earnings from the export of tin, especially
those of the tin-producing developing countries, and thus contribute to the
provision of these countries with the necessary means to accelerat e economic
growth and social development, whil st at the same time considering the
intere sts of consumers in the importing countries"'so. Then, ten years later,
there was a note, for the first time, of the röle "which the International Tin
Agreement can play in the creation of a New International Economic Order"
(lerter [b])". At the same time , rwo new objectives were added to the existing
ones: "to promote increasing use of tin and increased domestic processing,
especially in those tin-producing countries which are in the development
stage" (Art. 1 [f), and " to promote the expansion of the tin market in tin-
producing countries which are in the development stage, so that they can have
a greater share of the proceeds of tin sales" (letter [k])". Tbe sixth, and as yet
last, International Tin Agreement left it at thi s.
It is noteworthy that after 1965, even those objectives which were (still )
central, were extended considerably. The aim of balance between world
production and world consumption, and of minimizing serious problems
resulting from an over- or undersupply, has been extended since 1975 to
include even the mere expectation of over- or undersupply (Art . I [a]), and
from an even earlier stage, since 1970, efforts have been directed not only
toward preventing excessive f1uctu ations of the tin price, but also specifically
against fluctuations of the relevant expo rt earnings",
8. Following the treaties of the thirties", the parries to th e first Agreement
saw the necessity for regulato ry provisions, in that they recognized (Preamble
[a]) "the enormous importance of tin for several countries", because they
"depend to a high degree on favourable and fair conditions for the production,
consumption and trading of tin ", As regard s technical implernentation, Art. 61
(2) HCh had provided for either the regulation of production, or a control of
the volume of imports and exports - with the intention, or (possible) effect, of
cutring back (or prev ent ing a rise in) production and trade (letter [a]) - or for
the regulation of the price (leerer [b]) . In the case of tin , a "buffer stock" -
initially in the guise of a "pri ce regulati on 'reserve"" - was established as the
central mechanism (Art . VIII), with contributions - at least a quarter in cash-
coming only from the producer countries. A mana ger was instalIed to buy, seil
and hold stock (Art. IX). Ir was his respon sibility to undenake the necessary
transactions to keep the price of the metal within a range which was initially set
by international trea ty (Art. VI (2», and afterwards could be redefined by the
International Tin Council {Art. VI (3». In addition, the International Tin
Council, as the central o rgan of the new international organizat ion (Art. IV),
was "from time to time to determine the volumes of tin which could be
exported by the producer countries, in accordance with the provisions of this
article" (Art. VII (1) 1), bearing in mind th e task of "adjusting supply to
demand, and thus holding the tin price berween the floor and ceiling price"
(ibid. , p. 2, appended to Art. I (bj), In addition to these export quotas, and
borrowing from their regulatory framework, Art. XII provided for a control
of produetion by restricting permissible stocks in the producer countries to a
maximum of a quarter of the export volume of the preceding 12 months.
Further (restrictive) provisions were permissible in the case of an (approach-
ing) shortage (Art. XII; see also preamble, letter (e)), and the participating
states further declared "that in order to avoid a fall in living standards and the
introduction of unfair competitive conditions in international trade, they will
strive to guarantee fair working conditions in the tin industry" (Art. XV)".
The implementation of the provisions of the agreement and the monitoring
of their effective operation was the task of the International Tin Council, with
its headquarters in London (Art . IV A (1)). The producer and consumer
countries each had 1,000 votes on the Council (ibid., C (12)); each member
state had a minimum of five basic votes and these were topped up on the basis
of the country's economic importance with regard to this commodity".
Decisions were taken by a simple rnajoriry, and a high quorum (Art. IV B (10))
ensured that decisions were supported by both sides. The rwo vice chairmen
also had to be elected from the two separate sides (ibid., A (5)); the election of
the chairman, however, needed a separate rwo thirds maioriry" (ibid. , A (3)
(a)). In accordance with Art. IV A (6), the Council was charged with
nominating the manager of the buffer stock. The latter was directly responsible
only to the Council Chairman in the execution of his duties laid down in the
agreement, and was not allowed "to request or receive" any directive with
regard to bis management "from any government, person or authority other
than ehe Council, or persons ... acting on its behalf" (ibis., A (7)). In addition ,
he was barred from having any financial interest in the tin industry or the trade
in tin. Finally, the ITC was granted privileges and immunities (Art. IV E): it
was, from the outset, "to be allowed sufficient freedom to operate in every
member country, within the scope of the relevant laws, as is necessary to carry
out its function as laid down in this Agreement" (ibid., (21))". This structure
thus also conformed with the Havana model, primarily in Arts. 60 (b), 63 (b)
and 64 of the Charter".
9. The methods of regulation and the organization of the first Agreement
were largely retained. The maximum capacity of the buffer stock was, how-
ever, already reduced in the second Agreement by one fifth, to 20,000 t.60, and
the span between the floor and ceiling prices was explicitly divided into three
zones (Art. VI (3)), with specific action to be taken by the manager in each
zone (Art. IX (2)). In the fourth Agreement, the rules on the operation of the
buffer stock (Art. 25) are amended by powers given to the Council Assembly
and its (managing)61 chairman (Art. 27) to restrict, or even suspend, specific, or
even all, operations of the buffer stock. Compulsory contributions are still
required only from the producer countries (Art. 21), but the consumer
countries, and even outsiders, may make voluntary contributions (Art. 22)62.
From external appearences, the fifth Agreement (1975) represented a certain
break with the past·', though from a content point of view, lirtle was changed.
However, the ITC was now given powers to take out loans for (amongst other
things) the buffer stock account (Art. 7 (d» , though Art. 24 set down strict
conditions, in particular the qualified assent of the two groups of member
states, All expenses which were exclusively attributable to buffer stock opera-
tion, were to be paid by the manager through this account (Art. 6 (a) (iiij) . The
funds of the buffer stock consisted of the compulsory contributions of the
producers (Art. 21), together with any additional contributions by the con-
sumer countries (Art. 22); they could be supplemented by taking out loans on
the money markets and by the facilities provided in Art. 24 (Art. 20 (b)). Art.
28 (c) (v) instructed the manager, in the event of the market price for tin (letter
(b) reaching, or falling below, the floor price (see Art. 27), and to the extent
that he had no contrary instructions from the Council, and had sufficient funds
available, and with the reservation of the possible restrietion or suspension of
the operation of the buffer stock in accordance with Arts, 28 or 31, to enter the
recognized markets (Art. 28 (d) as a buyer of tin at the floor price, even if this
led to the bitter end of illiquidity. The fifth Agreement also clearly stated (Art.
15 (d)) that the legal position and the privileges and immunities of the ITC on
the sovereign territory of the United Kingdom continued to be regulated by
the Headquarters Agreement of 9. 2. 197264•
The provisions of the sixth International Tin Agreement, of 1982, differ in
one essential point. With regard to the borrowing powers of the Council, it
now simply stated (Arts. 7 (b), 24) that this was permissible against the
provision of tin warrants'" as securities if the Council deemed this to be
necessary: even the content and conditions of borrowing were (now) subject
only to approval by the ITC, with a separate simple majority in accordance
with Art. 15 (2). The provisions of Art. 28, on the other hand, remained
unchanged. Chapter VII, dealing with privileges and immunities, finally,
omitted, in its single article, to point to the existing headquarters agreement,
and simply stated in general terms the applicability of such an agreement
between the host country - no longer necessarily the UK (cf. Art. 2 (2), (3»-
and the International Tin Council (Art. 16 (4»66. The previous (fifth) Agree-
ment had already - also in Art. 30 (2) - given the buffer stock manager enabling
powers to seil a sufficient quantity of tin at the daily price, on behalf of the
Council, if, and as long as, he did not have sufficient funds to cover his
operating costs , As the rules relating to such a liquidation of the buffer stock
make clear (Arts. 25 and 26), such "other operations" (can) take place in
addition to the regular activities of the manager. In the case of dissolurion,
particularly where loan repaymenrs must be met, there is a provision empow-
ering the manager to seil sufficient tin to accumulate the necessary additional
funds, the Council decid ing on the time-scale and the amount,
10. The sixth Agreement provided for a basic "normal" buffer stock of
30,000 t , of tin, financed by the contributions of the government signatories -
for the first time, the consumer countries were also required to make contribu-
tions (Art. 22 (1» 67 - and a supplementary stock of a further 20,000 t . This was
to be financed by borrowing, drawn against tin warrants as security and, where
necessary, guarantees (of the member states) (Art. 21, together with Art. 2, 4).
However, the actual coneributions amounted to only 20,000 t.6' .
The price framework, which remained in three stages, spread over a range of
30% of the floor price (Art. 27 (1» . In accordance with Art. 27 (2) and (4), the
floor and ceiIing prices were based on those obtaining on the expiry of the fifth
Agreement ; these were simply continued'", pending being newly fixed by the
ITC - which never happened. The floor and ceiling prices are given in
Malaysian currency - the Ringgit - the external value of which is determined
on the basis of a basket of currencies of its major trading partners/", The
Agreement still failed to determine (cf. Art. 28 (3» what types of transaction
the buffer stock manager was a1lowed to enter into to stabilize prices; on the
contrary, he was to some extent still allowed to play the futures rnarkets (Art.
28 (5» " .
In accordance with chapter XIV, export restrictions were in place from the
time the Agreement came into force. However, they were not very effective,
since neither Bolivia nor the USA were signatories to the sixth Agreement, and
other third party producers were also able to achieve considerable rates of
increase in productiorr".
There were two factors which were mainly instrumental in the development
of the acute crisis in intergovemmental tin regulation: the economic recession
in (industrialized) consumer countries, which accelerated the rate of slowdown
in demand for commodities" , and the steady rate of increase in the production
of tin, which was, at the very least, not discouraged by the strength of the US $
on the money markets, The increase in value of the world's number one
reserve currency against Sterling , the currency used on the London Metal
Exchange, and therefore also by the ITC, led, in view of the elose US $/
Ringgit relationship" , to a constant increase in the tin price in f. Sterling. At the
same time, though, there was no revision of the initial floor price. Whatever
the reasons may have been - whether the buffer stock manager did not a1ways
use entirely above-board methods of transaction and/or did not co-operate
sufficiently with the related organs, the International Tin Council and its
Buffer Finance Committee (Art. 9 (c»", so that as a result he did not institute
counter-measures in accordance with Art. 29 in time - permission not to have
to intervene automatically in the market (An. 28 (3) (e)), even if the tin price
dropped below the floor price, was not forthcoming until too late, in the
summer of 198576• The end came with a certain amount of inevitability, at a
time when the US $ was rapidly losing value, which did not make the over-
supply of tin disappear, but merely (!) led to a drastic fall in the price of tin .' ·
By the end , the buffer stock had risen to over 63,000 t ., but was faced by
immense debts, Had all of the futures transactions run their course, then this
stock would have been increased by several tens of thousand tonnes - and thus
reached approximately the level of the stocks of all of the producer countries,
or even of the US strategie reserve (120,000 t.)78.
In 1986, the International Tin Councilliquidated the buffer stock after some
creditors agreed to accept repayment of debts in kind?". This, though, was only
the beginning of the legal disputes over who was actually responsible (and to
what extern) for the outstanding liabilities of the organization (see below: IV.) .
III. Tbe Domestie Basis and Effea« of a Commodity Regime - Tin
1. Since tin starred to be transported and traded internationally, the interna-
tional tin markets have always been subject to extreme price fluctuations, the
attenuation of which has been the major objective of international co-opera-
tion in this sector from the very beginning. The reasons for this need for
stabilizing intervention are obvious. On the production side, the number of
countries with minable tin reserves was very small and restricted to very few,
remote regions, primarily South East Asia and South America; some major
producers, such as Indonesia and Malaysia, were gran ted independence only
after 1945" . With the exception of the USSR and Australia, and to some extent
also ehe United Kingdom, the producers are developing countries with very
different political systems and at different stages of socio-economic develop-
ment. Recently, China and Brazil, which have not so far been signatories to the
International Tin Agreements, have achieved considerable increases in produc-
tion . Tin is not a major element in the trade balance , or even of the raw
materials exports, of all of the producer countries. However, it is the case that
the fate of Bolivia is, to a very large extent, dependent on the development of
tin export prices", In Malaysia, too, the world's largest producer, the prosper-
iry of the population stands and falls not only on export earnings from natural
rubber, tropical timber, palm oil and petroleum, but also on earnings from tin .
2. Precisely in the "classic" producer countries of the tropics, the foreign
economic aspect is thus (Irequently) pushed into the background, behind
domestic political and economic considerations. Because of the imponance of
tin exports for the national economy, the organization of production and not
least the situation of the employees are of immense importance. However, not
all producer countries have taken the radical step of taking the mining,
proeessing and/or markering of the metal into their own hands, i. e. charging
nationalized industries with these tasks and banning private sector dornestic
and foreign competitors from any (parallel) activity, or even nationalizing
existing companies'S,
It is true that the regulations governing (mineral) resourees everywhere in
the world are judged from the historical perspective of mining". At least this
applies in the (toned-down) sense that there are special rules governing mines
and mining, not least with regard to the appropriation of the minerals
produced".
A (mere) lieenee system within the framework of mostly refined legal
regulations, the traditional model for large scale investment - not only in the
mining sector'" - ean, however, only be eonsidered in those eases where legal
regulations and a functioning state administration make such graduated prob-
lern-solving possible'", In addition, the operation must be capable of properly
utilizing private finanee, if not from domestic entrepreneurs/lenders, then
from foreign ones. However, if produetion and/or proeessing is not (also) to
be left to a transnational eorporation or a foreign-dominated bank eonsortium,
then precisely the developing countries have hardly any other option than to
run the industries through their own nationalized companies, beeause only the
sovereign state itself is eapable of raising the neeessary finance . Ir is clear, that
in doing this, considerable sums will be raised on foreign and international
money markets in the way of foreign direet investmenr", so that in the last
analysis eontinuing sovereignty over natural resourees" onee again depends
(indirectly) on the aeeess to foreign funds of private transnational powers'",
something that was and is possible only for a very few third world countries.
This fact clearly highlights the interdependenee of the international economy,
something which is also evident in the multi-dimensionality of transnational
rules - their relationships in internationallaw are often just as diffuse as their
regulatory character'" , Of course, in project finance, at least in the majority of
eases, a projeet has to be realized, in the long or short term, whieh is self-
regenerating, so that the influx of finanee does not constantly increase the
foreign debt of the borrowing country, but, on the eontrary, ean and should
contribute to the reduetion of this",
3. Whilst deposits of mineral resources ean thus have a lasting impact in
shaping the (unstable) eeonomie sovereignty especially of developing coun-
tries, pattieularly when no enclave eeonomy of a state within a state has been
created'", the effeet is by no means restricted to the eeonomy. On the income
side of the budget, for instanee, there is the ereation of new revenue : export
and licenee levies, sums to be paid by state-controlled firms etc.", all of whieh
provides a major part of the pre-requisites for being able to pursue diversified
development policies. Infrastructural measures are also possible, to the extent
that they have not already been undertaken by the project bearers". Produc-
tion creates (and maintains) jobs in the area of operations and in supplier
companies of every hue, not least in the producer state . The tin workers of
Bolivia represent(ed) something of a prominent force in that country, partly
because of their stable unionization. The conflict berween a few tin barons and
the poorly paid mineworkers who worked under shocking conditions came to
an explosive head in the revolution of 1952. It led to the nationalization of tin
mining and the introduction of universal adult suHrage, and established the
r öle of this group of workers in modem Bolivian sociery'", Here too, though,
the price collapse in the autumn of 1985 led to more than a noticeable loss of
revenue: the lack of competitiveness of the "old" tin production in Bolivia in
comparison to newcomers in this sector soon resulted in mass job-lasses in the
state company COMIBOL, as in the rest of the economy. The new/old
President, Paz Estenssoro, is making eHorts to regain economic stability by a
(partial) re-privarization of state companies and other forms of retreat of the
public sector from welfare tasks, in conformity with the conditions of the
IMf"6. It currently appears as though another metal- silver - will (once again)
take over from tin as the primary export product'" - a poor consolation for the
umpteen thousand unemployed in Potosi and other mining towns in Bolivia.
4. The wider range of comrnodities produced in Malaysia spared it from a
similar critical siruation. However, the tin-price collapse of 1985 also suddenly
pur tltis ASEAN member" into a negative growth situation, A quick response
of this federal state naturally had to take account of the "New Economic
Policy", which was intended to remove the inequality berween the ethnic
groups of Malays, Chinese and Indians, and elose ehe gap in the political and
economic r öles in the interests of the largest ethnic group, the Malays
("Bumiputra"j99. This kind of intervention disrupts a favourable investment
clirnate, just as do suspicions of fundamentalist islamic tendencies coming to
the fore. Nevertheless, Malaysia can be seen to be showing concern to improve
the legal framework for foreign (direce) investments, especially by allowing
foreign majority participation up to 100% (in companies of whose production
at least four fifths is determined for expert), by extended residence permits for
foreign managers and by tax incentives 'P', but also in the form of wages which
are still relatively low!". In contrast to Bolivia (and many other tin-producing
countries)'o" mining is not carried on by state-owned companies, but by
private sector companies, which merely require a licence. Thus, the regulatory
structure left by the former colonial power has remained fundamentally intact,
whilst in the oil sector, by contrast, a "state oil corporation'v'" was set up.
Moreover, in the capital, Kuala Lumpur, there is a commodities exchange. The
tin market there is (once again) functioning and the exchange has even decided
to introduce dealing in tin futures'?' .
5. The major producer countries were parties to the International Tin
Agreements right from the start; it was only in the sixth Agreement that
Bolivia ceased to participate'P'. In addition, seven producer countries have
been working together since 1983 in an "Association of Tin-Producing Coun-
tries"'Ob. In addition to Malaysia, Bolivia and Thailand, these are Indonesia,
Nigeria, Zaire and Australia, which together account for half of world
production. In order to reconstruct the market, these seven countries agreed in
1987 to (temporary) export restricrions and, to supplement this, to measures
for combatting smuggling. Similar obligations were also accepted by the third
party countries, Brazil and China.
6. If all these circums tances and factors are considered, then it is amazing
that any intergovernmental regulation of the tin market managed to function at
all in a passable mann er, bearing in mind that the already divergent interests of
producer and consumer countries are partially overlapped by the North/South
problems of development co-operation, and besides are to a large degree
dependent on domestic economic and technical processes, which allow only a
certain level of market operation. However, to the extent that there is still any
room for the interaction of supply and demand beyond extra-economic
intervention, the regulat ion mechanism of the International Tin Agreement
makes it possible particularly for states to engage in politically motivated
buying or selling and tolerable distortions, which cannot be accepted unseen
by the other parties'?", The organization of the international tin trade is thus
shown to be a concept of the lowest common denominator. Of course, the
disputes following the price debäc le in the autumn of 1985 showed that the
underlying thought behind this association might have had something to do
with the limitation of liabiliry: when and while ever there is any market
regulation within the framework of (multilateral) treaties , and sovereign states
are involved in market operations, their behaviour enters something of a legal
rwilight zone. On the one hand, the states cannot strip themselves of their
particular nature even when, on a co-operative level, they conclude treaties
with private parties and fulfil these, or in some cases do not, or only poorly'P,
On the other hand, they make use of the same rypes of action as natural
persons and other private legal entities, often compete with these, and more
and more frequently it is unclear - at least at first sight - whether a commercial
transaction is taking place with a state (in whatever form of organizational
derivation) or not' 09.
In most Western states, at any rate, cartels and trusts etc. are prohibired!" ,
Restrietions on competition are also being eliminated by external and suprana-
tional regulations, expecially by EC rules'!', However, this rejection is not
only rare in general international law, but - as ehe Charter 1974 and the
practice of "producer-carte ls" shows"' - associations of this kind are limited
only by the fundamental principles of the UN Charter: the commodity
"weapon"lIl may conflict with the prohibition of intervention, but can
scarcely be said to conflict with the prohibition of force" ' .
Did then , accordingly, several concepts - all based on state sovereignty -
fuse together in the !TC (and in other commodity agreernents ) into a kind of
armour, behind which, proteered from serious damage, forces which were
hostile to the market could safely act, with only the danger of losing their stake
money - by having to seil off their contribu tions cheaply - at any price - in the
event of liquidation? The damage would then be borne by all the dealers whose
activity provides the very point for implementing facilities for price stabiliza-
tion. For the idea that they would be able to obtain compensation from the
state on whose excbange!" the transaction was carried out is indeed a theoreti-
cally charming idea116, but the realizati on of such a claim comes up against
vinually insurmountable difficult ies!" .
IV. The Immunity of lntergouemmental (Commodity} Organizations
In court, the events surro unding the tin price deb äcle involved several
individual strands. On the one hand, exchange dealers were challenging the
decision of the Council of the London Meta! Exchange to fix a liqu idat ion
price of f 6,250 for the contracts which were still open on c. 60,000 t. of tin ,
roughly corresponding to the market price at the time. Secondly, a ereditor
bank was seeking repayment of a revolving credit of f 10 million , which it had
originally granted the ITC in 1982. In this case, the plaintiff was able to point
to a stipulation that the contract was subject to English law, and that the
defendant irrevocably accepted the non-exclusive jurisdiction of ehe High
Courr' " and also agreed to the initiation of any legal proceedings against it l 19•
Then, in early September 1986, a group of 11 LME dealers applied for the
compulsory liquidation of the ITC, with the actual intention of bringing
actions against the member states of the organization . Some creditor banks
then attempted to bypass the ITC and demanded that the treaty signato ries
themselves (and the EC) I2Oshould meet the debts of the ITC vis-ä-vis the
banks. Finally, several brokers got arbitral awards, in accordance with the rules
of the LME, and then sought to gain enforcement of these by the Coure!" .
2. This case clearly highlighted the weaknesses of self-regulation'F which
has (had) a long tradition in the stock market and financial secto rs in the UK123.
Sufficient transparency and effective supervision can be esrablished and
guaranteed only with in a government-sponsored regulatory framework .
3. At the heart of the controversy is the question of the type and extent of
the immunity of ehe International Tin Council from the jurisdiction of a
(member) state , Only if it can be shown not to exist (in concrete terms) is there
any hope of success resulting from legal action, for this is all interwoven with
the problem of piercing the corporate veil"'24, just as court proceedings against
governments also come up against the hurdle of sovereign imrnunity.
4. Since 1970, the International Tin Agreements - like other commodity
agreements!" - do not actually delineate the privileges and immunities of the
International Tin Council, but (simply) assign legal personality to this central
organ (Art. 16 [1] 1). If the existence of the organization-person thus (also) has
its basis in international law, its demise can hardly be brought about in the
same way as is the case for a legal person in domestic private law126• On the
other hand, the extent of its capacity to be a bearer of (international) legal
powers and obligations is considerably less than that of sovereign states , It is
measured, as formulated in the International Tin Agreement with regard to the
rights and functions of the Council (Art. 7 [a]), according to what is necessary
for the implementation and operation of the Agreement!", This, of course, is
something which the intergovernmental organization will have to establish for
itself.
5. In the case of tin, the "Headquarters Agreement" not only states that the
ITC possesses legal personality and the ability to enter into contracts, and also
that its archives and premises are inviolable!", but also that the Council enjoys
immunity from judicial enquiry and enforcement procedures, unless it has
expressly waived immunity in a particular case, and even then only to the
extent of the waiver declaration'P, The wording of the (UK) ITC (Immunities
and Privileges) Order 1972"°, however, is that immunity extends to "suit and
legal process " (Art. 6 [1]), whereas the Agreement referred to "jurisdiction and
execution" (Art. 8 [1]). In the international agreement (solely), there was also
the provision (Art. 23) that if the International Tin Council entered into formal
contracts (other than service contracts) with a person domiciled in the United
Kingdom, or an entity based there, or with its headquarters there, then these
would (have to) contain an arbitration c1ause. The implementation of any
arbitral award could not be considered to be subject to immunity (in any
enquiry procedure) (Art. 8 [1] [c])131.
In view of these normative findings, the English courts must first of all
establish whether there is any divergence of content between the international
agreement and the domestic implementation of this.
If the ITC is entitled to immunity only to the extent that the host stare
determines, then, in general terms , this means that actions can be brought
against the organization in the other member states and in third party states,
provided that there is no objection in internationallaw to the court venue, i. e.
it is not ..exorbitant" u a. As regards the location of assets or liabilities, however,
it is extremely doubtful whether a sufficient relationship to the host state of the
headquarters can be affirmed"'.
In the United Kingdom, on the other hand, it needs to be establ ished - if no
arbitration agreement was made ':" - whether the ITC really did waive its
imrnuniry. Of crucial importance here are the time of the declaration and the
form it took, To this extent, too, it depends on the legal frarnework in the host
state,
6. Something which is unclear and extremely difficult, finally, is the prob-
lem of material immunity, especially as regards intergovemmental associa-
tions. A large seetion of the literature'", and increasing state practice - which
finds not a litde of its expression in multilateral agreements!' (and drafts ll7) -
distingui shes sovereign from commercial acts - in the restrictive view, only the
former are not subject ro the jurisdiction of a foreign state138 - not (pr imarily)
according to the purpose of the acts, but by their "nature".
For international organizations , there are no detailed provi sion s, either in
general terms or in individual international law instruments (or in state law
prov isions). The Whether and the How of immunity are determ ined much
rather according to individual functional parameters , However, it can hardly
follow from this that all contracts made berween an intergovem mental instim-
tion and private persons/entities must fall ou tside national jurisdiction simply
because the action is taken in pursuit of organization objectives, Stares, too, do
not enter into contracts (primarily) with the intention of making profits!". In
addit ion to this, a withdrawal from , or inadequate fulfilment of, a contract, in
both situations, may easily be motivated not by economic con siderations, but
by political ones!" . It can hardly be acceptable in such a case to continue to
treat the miscreant state "as a private person", whilst granting an international
organization imrnuniry, That there is no differentiation made in the protective
provision , so that no limitation is possible, is as unconvincing in this matter as
elsewhere!" .
7. Now it can scarcely be disputed that the legal relations berween the ITC
and its member states (ind uding the host state) are govemed exdusively by
international (trea ry) law. Therefore , when the representatives of the indi-
vidual states meet in the central organ of the organization, the International
Tin Council, and make decisions, then this behaviour takes place within the
framework and on the level of intemationallaw, and is to be regarded - from
the perspective of immuni ty law - as jure imperii. At the same time, the
external implementation of contracts entered into with private parties for the
regulat ion of prices"? need not necessarily have the character of the intemal
legal acts of the organization , but, especially if - as is widely held - in the
absence of exceptional intem ational law regulations, the law of the host state is
relevant':", then this principle may, indeed must, under certain circumstances
be ignored in accordance with the host state's legislation.
The idea of direct action against the ITC members is a totally different
matter: they had not made any direct contracts with the dealers and brokers on
the LME, and other lenders, i. e. the participating states had not stepped
(down) onto the level of co-ordination. Insofar as they were at all active (in the
ITC), and this - or even the absence of any activity - resulted in negative
financial consequences for the private parties referred to, there is no overriding
evidence that this behaviour was not determined by public interests and /or
could be classified as being of a "comrnercial nature" from any other point of
view!". Ir is therefore more than understandable that the search for a solution
should continue on the diplomatie level.
v. The Common Commodity Fund - 15 Failure at Hand?
I. There are many reasons for the collapse of the (sixth) International Tin
Agreement. From the point of view of timing, the spectacular collapse in the
autumn of 1985 can almost certainly be traced back to the combination of a
decline in demand in real terms, with an increase in the tin price because of the
strength of the dollar.
Even in such exceptional circumstances, there is no need why intergovern-
mental cornmodiry market regulation should fail, as long as account is taken of
certain requirements. These primarily include:
a) the need for all (major) producer and consumer countries to be parties to
any agreement, so that outside agreements by third parties are not possible,
or at least will have little effect;
b) a re-organization of the content of agreements so that rapid and flexible
reactions to (unforeseeable) market changes are possible. For this to work,
unanimity or qualified majority rules in organs with large numbers of (state
representative) members are not feasible. On the contrary, provision must
be made in the agreement itself for revisions to be made to the floor and
ceiling prices under certain conditions. A conceivable possibility here
would be an obligation upon the administration of the organization to
propose new price levels, and /or temporary authorization of the buffer
stock manager to enter more closely defined transactions, even outside of
the price range set down in the agreement, which would be binding on the
organization. By setting a fixed time limit, the central organ could then be
induced to act swifdy itself;
c) clearer rules on liability than have hitherto been provided'" - not only in
the case of commodity organizations.
2. Precisely on this last point, ehere is no satisfactory solution provided by
the "Common Fund", either. This omission appears somewhat less threatening
in that the Fund's organs are not empowered to intervene in commodity
markets (Art. 7 (8», so that a crisis such as happened in the ITC cannot occur.
On the other hand, even this new umbrella organization is empowered to
borrow (Arts . 15, 18 D.) to support all its activities (cf. Art. 16 B), i.e , not only
to finance commodity stocks. Iri relation to the lenders, though, the immunity
of the Fund is explicitly lifted with regard to the borrowed arnounts, even from
the point of view of execution (Arts. 42 (I ) (a), (3» "·. There is no longer any
need for a waiver (Art. 49) in the loan agreement, as long as the required
domestic (implementation) measures have been carried out (Art. 50)' 47.
Whether, and in what circumstances, member states are liable for the
obligations of the Commodity Fund remains open ro question. Art. 17 G. does
indeed prescribe in great detail which of the various sums should be used, in
which order, for the repayment of loans from the First Account. If the funds
available are insufficient, then there will be an increase in the members'
ordinary capital contributions, the modalities of which are to be determined by
the supreme organ of the Fund, the Council of Governors (Arts . 20, 21) in an
extraordinary session (Art. 17 G. (14»'48. However, can the reason for and the
extent of an increase in contributions really be separated? Indeed, can a
creditor force the Fund to make such adecision with the argument that his/its
demand for repayment applies (only) to "the same kind"!" of money?
In the second "window", the granting of loans and supplements by the Fund
is restricted by the total amount available for this purpose, though this amount
does include borrowing by the Fund for this purpose (Art. 18 A. (I) (d» , for
which aseparate account is opened (Art. 18 D. (4) (b)) . However, if the
amount in the account is not sufficient to make interest and capital repay-
ments, then a very critical situation arises, because the use of other resources of
the Common Fund is specifically forbidden (ibid., (c)) and there is no
provision for the inflow of additional members' ccntributions'Y, We can wait
with bated breath to see who, under such circumstances, will be willing to
provide loans .
3. In conclusion, it can be stated that minor legal corrections are not
sufficient 10 solve the problems arising. The "old", but by no means dead
world economic "order" always looked upon commodity control agreements
with suspicion . In answer to the demands for tbe - not a - "new" order, on tbe
other hand, the balance of interests, even in the price-regulating organizations,
was not adequate to bring about the required compensation and overcome
under-development. Sooner or later, atternpts at mediation were doomed to
failure. There is little hope that market instabilities could be better evened out
at a time when third world states are beginning to make "debt-Ior-goods"
proposals to their foreign (private) creditors. As long as the subsistence
problems of commodiry-producing developing countries are not managed by
international action, the question remains as to whether the only option open
to them is the cartel? Undesirable as this is, the concept is moving - here, as in
the debt crisis - into the realms of the possible .. .15'
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